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Challenges to the Patent System 
By Giuseppina D’Agostino* 
A Introduction 
One of the underlying justifications of the patent system is to encourage 
dissemination of scientific knowledge and promote innovation.1 Yet, the patent 
system is not a green card to innovation. Indeed, given our progress in science 
and the increasing rate of technological developments it is ironic that there is 
arguably a declining rate of innovation.2  From this perspective, it might be 
contended that the patent system is not meeting its said objectives. But the 
patent system should be seen in a wider context. While well-intended, it is far too 
simplistic to argue that patents are good or bad for innovation, or that they „freeze 
or spur‟ innovation.3 The challenges to the patent system are complex and 
*
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1
 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), “R&D, Innovation and Patents”, online: WIPO 
<http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/research.html>; Vincent J. Napoleon, “Impact of 
Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for Biotechnology” (2008) 1 J. Tech. 
L. & Pol‟y 3. 
2
 See generally, J. Huebner, “A Possible Declining Trend for Worldwide Innovation” (2005) 72 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 980 at 980-86; In Canada, see Council of Canadian 
Academics, Innovation and Business Strategy: Why Canada Falls Short (Ottawa: Council of 
Canadian Academics, June 2009), online: Council of Canadian Academics 
<http://www.scienceadvice.ca/documents/(2009-06-11)%20Innovation%20Report.pdf>; See also 
Mario Coccia, “Democratization is the detriment of technological change” (2008) CNR-Ceris 
Working Paper No. 6, online: Conisglio Nazionale delle Richerche (CNR)-Ceris 
<http://www.ceris.cnr.it/ceris/workingpaper/2008/WP_6_08_COCCIA.pdf>; In the pharmaceutical 
industries drug attrition is a mounting problem: I. Kola & J. Landis, “Can the pharmaceutical 
industry reduce attrition rates?” (2004) 3 Nature 711 [Kola & Landis]. 
3
 F. Lévêsque & Y Ménière, “Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes?” (December 2006) Centre 
d‟économie industrielle Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris at 3 [Lévêsque & 
Ménière] (the title belies the multi-faceted study on various aspects of the patent system); R. 
Thomas, “Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the 
Judicial Design of Optimal Software Patent Law,” online: SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114065>; S. O‟Connor, “IP Transactions as Facilitators of the 
Globalized Innovation Economy” (Lecture delivered at Entrepreneurship, Innovation and 
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cannot solely be attributed to its laws. That is, the patent system‟s constituting 
laws do not tell the full story. Often more telling are the institutional frameworks 
and socio-cultural and economic practices at the pre-patent inventive stage and 
the post-patent commercialization stage and beyond. And so when attempting to 
predict future developments, and ultimately, craft solutions, understanding and 
ensuring that the wider context is effective is paramount. 
In order to anchor this discussion which explores the challenges in the 
existing patent system and in the possible solutions, the institutional aspects of 
the patent system, which play a material role alongside the law, will be examined. 
For example, while technology has facilitated online filing, patent application 
costs remain prohibitive. Technology could be used more effectively to minimize 
these costs and equalize the playing field. At the same time, with the speed of 
technological developments, patent examiners‟ knowledge often remains dated. 
Here the peer-to-patent system being experimented in the UK, Japan, the US 
and Australia is an attractive mechanism of galvanizing user-generated 
communities to review patents and infuse fresh and accurate expertise in the 
examination process. Ultimately, costs might be reduced as well as ensuring that 
more robust patents are granted. Another opportunity to reshape the patent 
administration process and to reduce transaction costs especially for poorer 
applicants, such as independent inventors and universities is to consider a move 
towards a global patent system, but it too is not without challenges. 
Commercializing IP Conference at IP Osgoode and Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York 
University, Toronto, February 11, 2010), publication pending in R. Dreyfuss et al, Working Within 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (London: Oxford University Press, 2010) (argues that 
while there are certainly some “bad” patents, IP is generally not a problem, but usefully allows 
transactions to take place). 
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B Challenges in the Patent Context 
1 IP Discourse: IP is good v IP is bad 
Engaging in absolutist debates that IP is good or IP is bad, and 
specifically, that patents are good or bad may hinder properly recalibrating the 
patent system. And so, while not obvious, the dominant discourse surrounding 
the patent system may present a “challenge” in itself to even beginning a healthy 
conversation of patent challenges, and eventually, patent reform. Governments 
may be reluctant to deploy resources to lost cause issues especially where they 
may lose popularity and votes if they are seen to act in a fashion inconsistent 
with either mantra. For instance, with the recent prospect of moving towards a 
globally harmonized patent system, discussed later, the anti-IP camp may 
challenge governments‟ willingness to work towards recalibrating the patent 
system. Such anti-IP/patents-are-bad discourse draws in broad and diverse 
criticisms, with many that strike at the very merits of patent protection. 
Many of the commentators in the anti-IP camp have focused on the 
negative IP system‟s effect on global society from ideological, philosophical and 
sociological perspectives and in varying degrees.4 Such perspectives range from 
gender study criticisms of a “hypermasculinized” IP system, to violations of 
political and religious ideologies, to human rights concerns over the rights to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application to the right to health, 
4
 See generally R. Ghafele, “Perceptions of Intellectual Property: A review” online: Intellectual 
Property Institute (August 2008), online: IP Institute 
<http://www.ipinstitute.org.uk/pdfs/Perceptions%20of%20IP.pdf.> [Ghafele]. 
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food and self-determination.5 Many actors have also voiced their criticism of the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the TRIPs Agreement, arguing that 
the forum of negotiation, the WTO, was designed to benefit big business and to 
encourage a protectionist environment.6 Others further argue that because the 
developing countries were ill-informed and lacked the capacity to represent 
adequately their position on IP at the WTO, the result was a further entrenchment 
of the disparity in the North-South divide.7 
Significant criticism of patent systems has also been seen concerning 
public health and access to medicines. Strongly driven by NGOs such as 
Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
(OXFAM), the debate largely surrounds the impact of patents on the prices of 
medicines and the accessibility by those in need, mostly found in developing 
countries.8 Many campaigns have targeted the pharmaceutical industry 
specifically, often depicting the industry‟s practice of patenting essential 
medicines as devoid of morality and corporate social responsibility.9 
Commentators have similarly explored the ethical dimensions of the 
5
 Ibid. at 4, 5. 
6
 R. Rikowski, “Tripping over TRIPS: An Assessment of the WTO‟s Agreement on TRIPs, 
Focusing on Trade, Moral and Information Issues” (2003) 20 Business Information Review; see 
generally R. Rikowski, “A Marxist Analysis of the World Trade Organisation‟s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (2006) 4(4) Policy Futures in Education 




 E. Su, “The Winners and the Losers: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries” (2000) 23 Houston Journal of 
International Law 1. 
8
 Ghafele, supra note 4 at 14. 
9
 See O. Boateng, “The Profits that Kill”, New African (April 2001) 22-27 (summarized Oxfam and 
The Guardian‟s “Dying For Drugs” series on the pharmaceutical industry, in which they accused 
pharmaceutical companies of “systematically using patent rules to squeeze low-cost copies of 
branded medicines off the market” and for “making too much money for the West” at the expense 
of the poor in Africa). 
 
D’Agostino December 19, 2011 
5 
pharmaceutical industry‟s commoditization of patents and have questioned 
whether it is acceptable to view medicines as a luxury.10 Other criticism has 
centered specifically on the rigidity of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to 
medicines in developing countries. Critics have argued that many developing 
countries are still unable to take advantage of such flexibilities due to their lack of 
technical and administrative capabilities and the “TRIPS-plus” provisions 
contained in bilateral free trade agreements that have further diminished policy 
options to protect public health.11 It is further argued that the current patent 
incentive system leads to biomedical products that yield high profits rather than 
global priority health needs in developing countries.12 For example, malaria, 
pneumonia, diarrhea and TB account for 21% of the global disease burden, yet 
only receive 0.31% of all public and private funds devoted to health research. 
Further, over 1 billion people, mostly in the developing world, suffer from tropical 
diseases which are absent or neglected in R&D. 
The debate on IP has also been expanded to include a push for greater 
access to innovation and scientific progress for the global public good. Critics of 
the patent system have argued that the propertization and ownership of science 
and technology inherent to the current system have serious drawbacks on the 
                                                 
10
 M. Goozner, “Medicine as a Luxury: the West treats vital pharmaceuticals as just another 
commodity. If poor countries can‟t afford filet, why should they get cheap drugs?” (2002) 13 The 
American Prospect 1. 
11
 Report to the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP), Patents in the 
Global Economy by Duncan N. Matthews, (London: Intellectual Property Office, 2010), online: < 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-pglobal-201012.pdf >. 
12
 E.R. Gold et al, “Are Patents Impeding Medical Care Innovation?” (2010) 7 PLoS Med 1, at 3 
[Gold]. 
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science commons and the general welfare of society.13 Such a system also 
raises ethical issues due to its limitations on access to benefits of research and 
innovation, resulting in adverse effects on many populations. In what has been 
described as the anti-commons of biomedical research, critics have argued that 
the over-allocation of patents to biomedical research has resulted in valuable 
knowledge remaining underexploited due to limitations of access.14 A notable 
example of this effect is found with the human genome, where 20% of the genes 
are held under U.S. patents, the majority of which are owned by the private 
sector.15 Critics hold that the anti-commons effect results not only from the grant 
of patent rights, but also from restrictive downstream licensing practices. 
However, the debate on whether there exists an anti-commons tragedy of limited 
access remains unresolved as empirical evidence continues to be ambiguous.16 
While certainly not all such criticisms are unfounded, less rhetoric and 
more evidence-based reasoning may be warranted in order to more sensibly 
address the issues facing the patent system. Doing otherwise, and feeding the IP 
is good, or as noted here, the IP is bad debate, may remain a roadblock to fruitful 
changes in the years ahead. As will be explored more fully below, debunking the 
very idea of patent protection, and in doing so across the board, is unhelpful and 
unrealistic. A more nuanced, evidence-driven conversation would be salutary in 
the academic, policy and legislative circles. And so, more time, resources and 
                                                 
13
 L. Biron “The Rationale for Patents: A Philosophical Perspective”, at 7-10; see also The 
University of Manchester Institute of Science, Ethics and Innovation, “Who Owns Science? The 
Manchester Manifesto” online: The University of Manchester Institute for Science Ethics and 
Innovation <http://www.isei.manchester.ac.uk/TheManchesterManifesto.pdf>. 
14
 Gold, supra note 12 at 2, 3; S. Piper, “The Tools and Levers of Access to Patented Health 




 Gold, supra note 12. 
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expertise should be allocated to study the issues from various perspectives. At 
the same time, a critical lens should be cast when presented with any absolutist, 
catch-all arguments.  
 
2 Wider Context in a Sector-specific Approach 
In light of the absolutist IP discourse that presents a challenge to fixing the 
patent system in its own right, and the proposed need for greater evidence-driven 
conversation, the many more challenges that exist are best understood at a 
sector specific level. Not only have some commentators argued that some 
patents merit differential treatment,17 other studies have suggested that they 
merit different licensing solutions depending on the industry.  Every industry is 
unique and implicates a host of parties unique to its patent system.18 Indeed,  „… 
downstream commercialization requires coordination among the many 
complementary users of the patented invention, including, inter alia, developers, 
manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers, and marketers.‟19 In a 
survey of 229 US and Canadian firms, only 4% of licensable technologies were 
found to end up in a license.20 Of the 100 licensable technologies, a potential 
                                                 
17
 B. Condon & T. Sinha, “Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO 
Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries” (2005) 26(1) Nw. J. Int‟l 
L. & Bus. 1 (discussing several WTO mechanisms for implementing special and differential 
treatment in TRIPS with respect to pharmaceutical patents); K. Outterson, “Should Access to 
Medicines and TRIPS flexibilities be limited to specific diseases” (2008) 34 Am. J.L & Med. 279. 
18
 Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 74; P. Jenkins, “Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation 
and Commercialization in Turbulent Times” (Lecture delivered at the Conference Board of 
Canada, Sheraton Hotel, Toronto, 29 May 2009) [unpublished] (commentary of lecture available 
online at IP Osgoode <http://www.iposgoode.ca/2009/06/conference-board-of-canada-event-
highlights-importance-of-ip-protections/>). 
19
 S.F. Kieff, “IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation” (2005) 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 311, online: SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=821327>. 
20
 Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 53. 
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licensee is found in only 25 cases.21 Valuable patented technologies are often 
unexploited. There are various reasons for this including disagreement of 
royalties between parties, costs to search for potential partners, internal 
approvals concerning exclusivity, opportunistic behaviour among firms where 
partners may appropriate disclosed information without a licence. As a result, 
firms that have existing relationships might engage more easily in licensing 
agreements.22 Overall, the chances that a patent is successfully commercialized 
and actually returns a profit are extremely low. But when there is commercial 
success, the rewards can be high.23 
 
3 Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industry   
Take the pharmaceutical industry as a case in point. While pharmaceutical 
patent right holders might argue that the patent protection term is too short, 
irrespective of the time of protection allocated, pharmaceutical discoveries should 
become more efficient. The issue is not purely a legal one. Current drug attrition 
is quite high and even 100 years of patent protection would not solve 
pharmaceutical woes.24  On the contrary, a prolonged term of protection might 
disincentivize pharmaceutical industries from discovering new drugs. One vehicle 
for generating new patentable drugs is for pharmaceuticals to partner with 
universities conducting multidisciplinary research in diverse areas as 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. at 53. 
22
 Ibid. at 54. 
23
 Ibid. at 64. 
24
 Kola & Landis, supra note 2; I. Kola, “The State of Innovation in Drug Development” (February 
2008) 83 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 227. 
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nanotechnology, drug delivery, monoclonal antibodies and stem cells to name a 
few.  
Here the patent system might be improved in order to further promote 
innovation in universities conducting drug research. For example, patents are 
prohibitively expensive and universities do not have the resources for national 
phase filing expenses, legal costs associated with translation between countries 
and other costs. For instance, any applications filed pursuant to the European 
Patent Office (EPO) must be written in one of the three official languages: 
English, French and German. If accepted, patents must be translated in the other 
two languages and in any country in which the innovators claim a patent. In the 
result, a European patent activated in 7 countries costs 7,000 euros in 
translations. Comparatively, a European patent costs on average 24,100 euros to 
its holder, whereas a US patent 10,250 euros and a Japanese patent 5,460.25 
Such fees are especially onerous for university-based applicants. Commentators 
argue that the costs „should be incurred only if it is outweighed by a larger social 
benefit in terms of information diffusion‟,26 alas one of the goals of the patent 
system. But as Lévêsque and Ménière argue this is not the case for most 
translations which are often unread and only available several years after the 
patent issuance. Consequently, „[t]his delay is too long relatively to the path of 
technological change.‟27  
                                                 
25
 Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 44. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid.; In addition, several reform projects are underway, such as the Community Patent and the 
London Protocol, to reduce the cost of translation of European patents in National languages. 
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Budgetary restraints are particularly acute for patents associated with 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology applications.  One reason specific to these 
industries is the need to generate pre-clinical data in order to attract an industrial 
licensee. However, in vivo pre-clinical studies can take from months to years to 
be completed, yet universities are often forced to file patent applications well in 
advance in order to secure a priority date.  Some may argue that universities 
should postpone filing biomedical patent applications until after in vivo data is 
generated, but academic researchers are faced with the predicament that they 
must publish their data in order to secure a grant to conduct the required in vivo 
experiments therefore forcing them to file prior to disclosure.  Considering the 
obstacles faced by university technology transfer, the patent system might be 
adapted to promote innovation within cash strapped universities.   
 
4 University Technology Transfer 
While there are „deep pocket‟ university exceptions, the majority of 
academic institutions can certainly file, but do not have the budget to maintain 
patents.  
Resources are scarce. Universities support researchers through 
technology transfer offices and advise on how to best commercialize valuable IP.  
Although these tech transfer offices are a critical resource, all too often 
individuals with limited industrial experience are recruited. Of course there are 
the exceptions, MaRS in Toronto is but one example, and in Canada the 
“Waterloo miracle” is a success story which features a model “innovation 
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ecosystem”.28 Launch Lab for the World is a new Canada-based industry-driven 
initiative which will draw from various public-private fora, including university 
know-how to launch the world‟s innovative technologies.29  
Due to the limited financial resources, the current innovation model 
developed in academic commercialization or knowledge-transfer centres is for 
applicants to secure a licence within a year of filing. Often universities employ a 
policy to file for a provisional but do not convert the application to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) phase at one-year, unless a licensing deal is in place. 
Such a policy results in numerous missed opportunities, especially in the 
biomedical sciences. Inventors lose their inventions as they are not able to 
commit to enter the national phase due to the inordinate expenses and lack of 
support. This raises the concern that valuable patent applications are being 
dropped too early.  And here, it is significant to appreciate that there is no one-
size fits all policy.   
There are various solutions available to enable promising inventions to 
make it to the national phase. First, university commercialization centres can 
soften their pre-national phase licensing rules, or at least, allow biotechnological 
inventions, often saddled with expensive and time-consuming in vivo trials, more 
time to materialize viable clinical applications.  A second solution, which I will 
address below, might be to reform the patent administration process to reduce 
                                                 
28
 S. Maich, “Why Canada Needs RIM to Win” Canadian Business Magazine (February 15, 2010) 
4; M. Castel, “IP Transactions as Facilitators of the Globalized Innovation Economy” (Lecture 
delivered at Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Commercializing IP Conference at IP Osgoode and 
Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University, Toronto, February 11, 2010) 
[unpublished]. 
29
 See Launch Lab for the World <www.launchlabfortheworld.com> (Launched at Canada 3.0 
Conference, Stratford, Ontario by Tony Chapman, Founder & CEO of Capital C Communications, 
10 & 11 May 1 2010). 
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transaction costs especially for poorer applicants, such as independent inventors 
and universities by considering (1) a move towards a global patent system; (2) 
relying on peer-to-patent initiatives; and, (3) implementing student-ran 
commercialization clinics. 
 
C Challenges in the Solutions 
 
1 A Move Towards a Global Patent System? 
Commentators are divided on whether a global patent system is desirable.  
Desirability is contingent on one‟s objectives for the patent system, and typically 
on a global scale, differs depending on whether the perspective is from a 
developed or developing nation.30 
 
(a) Benefits 
A global patent system is generally believed to reduce transaction costs 
(namely, filing fees and potential litigation). In the pharmaceutical and biotech 
context, a global patent system could cut down on expenses to assist parties in 
filing after pre-clinical studies. Commentators justify the need for a harmonized 
patent system to aid the globalization of commerce, reduce trade barriers and 
bolster stability and predictability in international patent protection.31 More 
                                                 
30
 Though there are certainly exceptions, see E. Alsegård, “Global Pharmaceutical Patents after 
the Doha Declaration: What Lies in the Future” (2004) 1(1) SCRIPTed 12, online: University of 
Edinburgh, SCRIPTed <http: www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/docs/doha.asp> (argues for the 
global protection of intellectual property rights for developing countries). 
31
 See e.g. R.R. Willis, “International Patent Law: Should United States and Foreign Patent Laws 
Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits, Problems, and Barriers” (2009) 10 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 
283 at 300. 
 
D’Agostino December 19, 2011 
13 
specifically, the five most common arguments for patent harmonization include: 
(1) reduction of patent costs by exchange of results between examining patent 
offices; (2) reduction of problems and errors during the prosecution of patent 
applications in foreign countries; (3) worldwide patent protection becomes 
effective; (4) each step of harmonization leads to further harmonization; and (5) 
further step-by-step harmonization may finally motivate the United States to give 
up the principle of first to invent.32 Indeed, the United States has been reluctant 
to change its domestic policies to align more with the international community, 
notwithstanding its push for a more global system. The Patent Reform Act of 
200933 represents the third consecutive congressional session to attempt the first 
overhaul of the U.S. patent system since 1952 and among its various proposals, 
switch from a first to invent to first to file system and make its domestic policy 
more congruent with its international counterparts.34 From an access to justice 
perspective, enforcement of patent suits would be more convenient and less 
expensive. Indeed, a law allowing a patent holder to consolidate multiple 
infringing acts in a single suit might not only save money but provide the only 
means for the patent holder to obtain redress.35 Of course, here one would have 




 U.S., Patent Reform Act, 111th Cong. (2009) (Mar 3, 2009) at s. 515, online: GovTrack.us 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-515>. 
34
 Most countries operate on a first-to-file system. For commentary, see A. Sabatelli & J.C. 
Rasser, “Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization” (1995) 22 N. Ky. L. Rev. 579; A.M. 
Seifert, “Will the United States Take the Plunge into Global Patent Law Harmonization? A 
Discussion of the United States‟ Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts” (2002) 6 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 173; R.K. Dickey, “The First-to-Invent Patent Priority System: An 
Embarrassment to the International Community” (2006) 24 B.U. Int‟l L.J. 283; H. Waters, “US 
switch to first-to-file patents could cause minor shake-up” (2011) 17 Nature Medicine 906. 
35
 S. Fernandes, “Annual Review: Intellectual Property: Patent: Note: Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T: A 
Welcome Return to Patent Law‟s Tradition of Territoriality” (2008) 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 75 at 
100-1. 
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to be a patent holder to begin with or have a claim to be protected, and be versed 
with the litigation process in the first place.  
 
(b) Disadvantages 
Typically the two most common sources of resistance are ideological and 
economic. Ideologically, three reasons typically lead to opposing patent 
harmonization: (1) reluctance of national governments to refashion their current 
systems; (2) abdicating on some national sovereignty in favour of a global 
system; and (3) reconciling various interests between the developing and 
developed world.36 Economically, there is an inordinate cost to implement a 
global patent system: to align the myriad domestic policies with an international 
standard, account for the early expense of administration (notwithstanding the 
future reduction in cost) and to determine a unified court system. As well, there is 
a strong argument insisting that were there to be a global system, special and 
distinct treatment would have to be carved out for unique entities, such as 
developing nations and pharmaceutical/biotech industries. A global patent 
system might also present potential for abuse by more powerful companies and 
states, and would have to have a robust review mechanism in place. 
 
 
(c) Global Patent Points to Ponder 
 
As nations are transforming from industrial-based to information-based 
economies, protection of intellectual property will affect trade issues on a global 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. at 301. 
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scale and necessitate a more collaborative approach to patent law.37 Whether 
under the aegis of a global patent system, more coordination at the international 
level will be important.  A number of areas of synchronization have been 
identified as necessary: a uniform definition of patentable subject matter, uniform 
filing and application procedures, uniform examination and grant procedures, and 
uniform interpretation, remedies and enforcement. As noted, the United States is 
moving towards a first to file system, though far from harmonized. An 
implementation of a globally harmonized first to file system would allow American 
inventors to file patent applications in English and supply a translated application 
at a later time. This would help to eliminate the current race to submit patents in 
foreign countries and the current dangers associated with translation errors in 
foreign application and the difficulties of correction after submission.38 Similarly, 
in Europe, continental harmonization faces various obstacles with the cost of 
translating an application to obtain a patent. Translation costs and various fees, 
is three to five times more expensive than a United States or Japanese patent. 
Another major disadvantage in Europe is the lack of a Community Patent Appeal 
Court, analogous to the federal Court of Appeals in the United States.39 A 
harmonized patent system in Europe would allow the patent to issue in all 
member states instead of the applicant having to choose the country of choice. 
                                                 
37
 R.L. Campbell, “Global Patent Law Harmonization: Benefits and Implementation” (2003) 13 Ind. 
Int‟l & Comp. L. Rev. 605 at 605 [Campbell]; A.R. Sommer, “Trouble on the Commons: A 
Lockean Justification on Patent Law Harmonization” (2005) 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc‟y 
141. 
38
 Campbell, ibid. at 623. 
39
 Ibid. at 625-27. 
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The patent would be subject to one interpretation throughout the world, a central 
court and administering body, and considerable reduction in translation costs.40 
Another misconception when criticizing a global patent system seems to 
be that technology is only generated in developed nations, rather than in 
developing nations. Consequently, it is often presumed that „weak protection for 
intellectual property will assist in obtaining developed country technology at little 
or no cost.‟41 Intellectual property protection may help generate the development 
of more technology in developing countries. Here, Mexico is cited as an example 
where once its patent laws were reformed in 1991, large numbers of patents 
were filed and were directly linked to contribute to local activity.42 A similar 
increase in technological development was seen in China in the late 1970s, when 
the country reformed its legal and economic policies to foster its involvement in 
the global economy.43 Also, consider that venture capital firms will not invest in 
technology without some certainty that their technologies are protected44. And 
from a university commercialization perspective, „[t]he expected synergy in these 
research parks has not appeared at the levels observed in countries with high-
stimulation systems‟,45 which include patent protection. In reconciling the global 
patent harmonization differences, one relevant policy question might be, to what 
                                                 
40
 Ibid. at 627. 
41
 Ibid. at 629. 
42
 R. Sherwood, “Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World” in M.B. 
Wallerstein et al., eds., Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and 
Technology (Washington: National Academy Press, 1993) 68 at 73 
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extent should interjurisdictional diversity and competition be sacrificed to achieve 
global uniformity?46 John Duffy argues that uniformity makes laws unresponsive 
to local variations, eliminates interjurisdictional competition and decreases 
possibilities for legal experimentation.47 The speculated dangers here are that 
with a uniform system the entire world would serve as a “laboratory” as 
experiments would be spread out temporally and not geographically. This might 
lead to decreased innovation and data outputs might be harder to interpret with 
the lack of a good control.48 While these claims are at best speculative, local 
diverse communities should not be completely outlawed for a single monolithic 
code. Again, it is worth noting that such challenges are not isolated to patent or 
intellectual property laws more broadly, but span most other legal systems.  
At the same time, it is unrealistic to assume that a unitary patent system 
will optimally encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it 
is expected to cover. Indeed, the rules applied to different industries increasingly 
diverge; some examples are found in biotechnology and computer software 
cases where courts have diverged in applying common law legal standards of 
obviousness, enablement and written description.49  Rather, as Dan Burk and 
Mark Lemley argue it might be more opportune to enable courts to tailor patent 
law to the needs of specific industries. Administrative agencies might also have a 
role in shaping statutory applications. In Canada, the Canadian Intellectual 
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Property Office, in the US, the Patent Trademark Office and, in the UK, the 
Intellectual Property Office, each plays such a fundamental role.  
 
2 Patent Administrative Offices – Peer-to-Patent Initiatives 
There are mounting problems in the patent administration process and its 
recalibration could present the most immediate and effective way to bolster the 
viability of the patent system.  As Peter Drahos argues, „[T]he vast majority of 
patents begin and end their life in a patent office … It is the daily patent office 
routines of a country that determine the build-up of patents in an economy, 
including pharmaceutical patents.‟50 At the USPTO and the EPO, there is an 
inordinate backlog of over a million patents to prosecute and patent examiners 
spend less than 30 hours per application.51 Delays in patent examination are 
problematic since applicants in the US for instance, will often specify other 
countries in which they want to preserve their US filing date but delay filing in 
these other jurisdictions until there is an outcome on the likelihood of patentability 
of the invention. In theory, this would save applicants money so as to avoid 
incurring needless expenses. But long delays in the examination process mean 
                                                 
50
 P. Drahos, “‟Trust Me„: Patent Offices in Developing Countries” (2008) 34 Am. J. L. and Med. 
151 at 152. 
51
 Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 3; A.K. Rai, “Growing Pains in the Administrative State: 
The Patent Office‟s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control” (2009) 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
PENNumbra 2051 at 2058 [Rai] (“…according to the PTO”s own statistics, the elapsed time 
before an applicant receives an initial response from the PTO increased from 21.1 months in 
2005 to 25.6 months in 2008.  At the end of Financial Year 2008, the PTO had not even begun 
review of over 770,000 applications.  A total of 1,276,028 were listed as pending--that is, either 
awaiting initial review or in the review process”). 
 
D’Agostino December 19, 2011 
19 
that “the time window for seeking international protection may close.‟52 In addition 
to the substantial delays, patent examiners often lack the wide-ranging technical 
expertise in reviewing the breadth of submitted applications.  These limitations 
are significant especially given that important decisions are made on whether to 
grant 20 year monopolies for inventions that will shape the future of an industry 
and fundamental research.53 Studies estimate that the deadweight loss of a 
“loose” patent system from lost innovation is approximately $21 billion each year 
in private costs alone, or nearly $200 per household per year.  This sizeable 
deadweight loss constitutes approximately 7% of annual R&D spending in the 
United States.”54 And as pronounced in Graham v. John Deere Co.55 “. . . the 
primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent 
Office. To await litigation is, for all practical purposes, to debilitate the patent 
system . . .”56 Third party submissions of prior art are increasingly rare because 
there is (1) lack of awareness of published patent applications; (2) lack of 
awareness of ability to submit prior art; (3) the inability to submit comments with 
prior art; and (4) the presumption of validity if the patent issues.57 There is thus 
an opportunity presented by the convergence of the publication of patent 
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applications, internet communications, and the emergence of collaborative 
communities. 
Peer-to-Patent initiatives are a way to connect the scientific and innovative 
arts communities to the patent examination process.58 The initiatives are 
premised on the idea that a public of expert peers can help the patent examiner 
find and analyse the “prior art” who ultimately can prosecute the patent more 
comprehensively and efficiently. A web-based system connects public peers to 
patent examiners. The US, the UK, Australia and Japan are leading the way on 
this front.  From a patent applicant‟s perspective the benefits are various, 
including the fact that it is cost-efficient, should result in stronger patents, and 
reduces application waiting times.  
The Institute for Information Law & Policy at New York Law School‟s work 
is particularly noteworthy. The project which began in June 2007 has been driven 
by consultative workshops, company and foundation support, professional and 
student teams, USPTO cooperation and a steering committee and advisory 
board. Its system is premised on simple communication of published patent 
applications with the consent by participating (volunteer) patent applicants. The 
system is based on an open, online review and comment system that takes place 
over the course of four months. The best prior art references with comments are 
forwarded to the examiner, who retains ultimate carriage of the file. Importantly, 
the examination is advanced at the top of the examiner queue. The New York 
Law School results have been positive as there has been enhanced patent 
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system integrity, fewer unworthy patents, and greater confidence in issued 
patents.59   
In the first year of the pilot,60 71 applications were submitted by 17 unique 
applicants with 173 prior art references.61 Of the 71 applications, 40 were 
reviewed by experts, with 365 active reviewers taking part in the reviewing 
process.62 The pilot was seen as a success, and in mid-July 2008, the USPTO 
announced it would extend the pilot a second year until June 15, 2009.63 The 
second year of the pilot saw the number of applications increase from 71 in Year 
One to 187 total applications at the end of May 2009.64 The number of unique 
applicants increased from 17 to 73 in Year Two of the pilot, citing increased 
press coverage and the USPTO expanding the eligible subject matter to include 
patent applications pending in Class 705: Business Methods and E-Commerce.65 
Furthermore, the number of active reviewers increased from 365 in Year One to 
505 in Year Two, a 38 percent increase.66 Overall, the growth of the pilot was 
very positive, and in October 2010, the USPTO and New York Law School jointly 
announced a new pilot program commencing October 2010 and continuing 
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through 30 September, 2011.67 Expectations are that the new pilot will draw more 
success and a new review is currently underway to assess its results. 
The success of the US initiative has led to similar pilots forming in other 
areas of the world, including Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom. In Japan, 
the Institute of Intellectual Property and Japan Patent Office began its pilot in the 
summer of 2008 with help from the New York Law School, and there have been 
over 40 patent applications submitted from 15 applicants, with 115 prior art 
references.68 The success of the project led to the Institute of Intellectual 
launching Peer to Patent Japan (P2PJ) in the beginning of 2011.69 The 
Queensland University of Technology launched a six month P2P initiative in 
December 2009 in conjunction with IP Australia and the New York Law School70. 
As of December 2010, there have been 31 patent applications submitted from 18 
applicants, with 106 prior art references.71 The UK Patent Office launched its 
P2P pilot on 1 June, 2011.72   
In the first review of the peer-to-patent pilot project, USPTO Director David 
Kappos illuminated some of the progress with the program thus far.73 There has 
been an increased interest in the program from innovators and university tech 
transfer offices, many which have stated that peer-to-patent can help them to 
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make early decisions regarding potentially costly patent prosecution. As 
university research and development often involves “embryonic” technology, the 
determination of patentability and market value to such emerging areas of 
technology can often be quite difficult and expensive. However, peer-to-patent 
can benefit tech transfer offices and private sector firms dealing with emerging 
technologies as it allows them to rely on the information collected and reported 
by peer-to-patent contributors when making investment decisions on the potential 
market value of their patent applications. Kappos also stated that its review of the 
pilot project shows that arts and technologies will receive the most benefit from 
peer-to-patent. 
The review also highlighted some early challenges, the most notable of 
which would be in the scaling-up of the program. Kappos noted that many 
businesses are reluctant to comment on others‟ patents for fear of willful 
infringement claims by patentees. The review also found difficulty in finding 
volunteers to submit prior art. While there were over 600 submissions of art, 37 
applications in the pilot did not receive a single submission. Thus, there is a clear 
challenge in scaling-up the program that would require on-going encouragement 
of participation. One solution Kappos noted was drawn from the “open 
innovation” model commonly used in software innovation. Such a model relies 
upon a set of volunteer “knowledge possessors” who each contribute a certain 
part in collaboration to create a complex program. Research has shown that an 
important incentivizing factor in getting programmers involved is that of prestige, 
as volunteer programmers are often known to each other. In applying this model 
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to P2P, groups of technical professionals may enjoy competitive rounds of 
submitting the best prior art or in demonstrating why a colleague‟s innovation is 
patentable or not. Kappos also believes that by expanding the P2P program 
dramatically, it would create market incentives for companies to invest in 
submitting prior art on their competitors applications. 
There is not much literature yet reviewing the peer-to-patent process. 
Absent careful study (and more results, as the projects are still at their infancy), 
only some speculative challenges can be recorded. Such pilot initiatives often 
involve resources, and require buy-in from key stakeholders. Sometimes the very 
issues that saddle the patent application process continue in the peer-to-patent 
process. In Canada, for instance, while CIPO is interested in spearheading such 
an initiative the bilingual language issue remains a challenge as all entries should 
be in both French and English to ensure the integrity and transparency of the 
process. Other issues involve the fact that the peer-to-patent process does 
nothing to alter operation of the patent laws, which remain unquestioned (e.g. the 
various standards of validity that may be seen as too weak to allow any patent 
through). Also peer submissions may be made only strategically by various 
parties, and might not be made if there is perceived fear of reproach by 
competitors. Still, more information and transparency would be a welcome 
ingredient in the patent examination process, especially given the need to make 
patents as “valid” and attractive to incentive investment as possible. 
Ultimately, something should be done to reform the patent administration 
process. Whether it is a peer-to-patent model and/or one which shifts the 
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examination burdens to the private sector, or increases responsibilities to the 
heaviest users, various creative solutions remain ripe for exploration and further 
study and action.74 There is no denying that more collaboration, which does not 
necessarily mean uniformity, is necessary. And in terms of access to justice 
issues, relying on patent litigation to eradicate invalid patents will not work for 
weaker parties in either developed or developing countries.  
 
3 Development of Resource-Friendly Innovation Centres 
With the prohibitive costs surrounding the filing of patents, the need for more 
resource-friendly alternatives for inventors and small businesses especially, is 
integral to foster innovation. In North America, the development of student-run 
commercialization clinics provide a low-cost alternative to these needy innovators 
to support their patent applications. 
 
In Canada, the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program of 
Osgoode Hall Law School (IP Osgoode) has partnered with the Ontario Centres 
of Excellence Centre for Commercialization of Research (OCE-CCR) to create 
the country‟s first student-run commercialization clinic, where Osgoode law 
students will be matched up with OCE-supported companies to help them secure 
and protect their intellectual property en route to commercial success.75 It is the 
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first of its kind in Canada as it is built on a unique collaboration between a law 
school and a proven, publicly-funded, innovation accelerator centre. 
Launched in September of 2011, the twelve-month pilot program has 
recruited six law students, the support of Osgoode IP professors and a well-
established IP firm to oversee the legal work and assist on a variety of intellectual 
property matters. The initiative initially focuses on patent law, but will eventually 
cover all areas of intellectual property. The project serves as beneficial to both 
the students and the inventors. The students invaluable legal training to foster 
their development as young legal professionals, while the inventors receive high-
end intellectual property advice through a pro bono avenue that reduces start-up 
costs. Although this is the first of its kind in Canada, the United States organized 
a similar program a few years earlier. The USPTO began a pilot program in the 
Fall 200876 involving six academic institutions in Phase One, and an additional 
ten schools in phase two77. Similar to the IP Osgoode/OCE-CCR program, the 
objective of the initiative was to provide students with a unique opportunity to 
counsel innovators, artists, entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations and policy 
makers on extensive ranges of intellectual property and business law issues.78 
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 Such initiatives can assist inventors and smaller firms to develop their 
technology at a cost that is more reasonable. The continual growth of such 
initiatives will foster patentable technologies at all levels, thereby reducing some 
of the barriers to entry faced by businesses with lower research and development 
budgets. 
 
D Concluding Observations  
So in the result, will, or should, we continue to have a patent system at 
least in the form as we now know it? The literature seems to accept that 
maintaining the current system is unavoidable, even if working to implement a 
more global system. Some argue that the only system that can work is the one 
that is currently in place. Even if a global system were to take shape, there would 
have to be a section carved out that somehow keeps the good elements of the 
system we have; diversity between nation states and industries is so substantial 
that a unified system devoid of consideration for these differences would fail to 
meet the inherent objective of serving the world community. There is no reason 
to assume that a unitary patent system will optimally encourage innovation. 
Ultimately, we should expect that the patent system meets the same objectives 
of encouraging dissemination of scientific knowledge that has been its traditional 
rationale, but much like the challenges, the solutions will be varied from the legal 
to the more practical.  Considerations of resources, administration, cultural and 
social practices are important from the invention to the commercialization stage. 
Any discussion of the patent system should have this greater context in mind and 
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avoid rhetorical absolutism. In other words, challenges to the patent system 
should be seen in this wider context and proposals for reform, within this more 
pragmatic context. 
